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Abstract
This paper analyzes how local governments misreport population figures to ob-
tain higher per capita grant allocations. In 1998, the allocation of a formula based
grant in Spain switched from using the centrally administered census to local pop-
ulation registers administered by municipalities. The value of this per capita grant
changes at fixed population thresholds for the entire local population. We exploit
these notches to analyze the size distribution of municipalities to detect deliberate
manipulation of the grant-assignment variable. This allows us to causally identify
the effect of grant generosity on population over-reporting. We document an ex-
cess mass of municipalities to the right of the notch threshold and a density hole
to the left of it: local registers included a proportion of ‘ghost citizens’, that is, peo-
ple who presented no trace of actually residing in the municipalities which benefit
the most from inflating population figures to pass the relevant threshold. We docu-
ment that manipulation (rather than real population responses) is the mechanism
at work. The main channel behind manipulation is the incorrect treatment of for-
eign residents to inflate total local population.
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1 Introduction
Local governments across the globe receive a substantial share of their revenues in the form of
grants from higher-level governments. In 2010, for example, this share was as high as 70% in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In other countries the share is smaller and local govern-
ments have more autonomy over their own resources (Foremny, 2014). In Spain, nearly 40% of
all local revenues are allocated as grants, high enough to warrant special attention. Not only the
quantity, but also the way in which these grants are allocated to cities and municipalities differs
across countries. The optimal allocation of grants has been discussed extensively (see Oates,
1972, 1999; Wildasin, 1986; Bird and Smart, 2002, for surveys) and it is typically concluded that
they should be allocated as unconditional block grants, so that local spending and taxation de-
cisions are not distorted. At the same time, it is argued that grants should be formula-based to
avoid any political bias in their allocation (Dixit and Londregan, 1995; Persson and Tabellini,
2002). Most formula grants, however, are vulnerable to manipulation by recipients because in-
formation needed to apply the allocation criteria is distributed asymmetrically between levels
of government (Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini, 2001; Huber and Runkel, 2006). Although
the academic literature has not paid much attention to this issue, the difficulties in gathering
reliable data to implement these formulas are a concern for both policy makers and advisers
(see, e.g., and Bahl, 2000 and Boex and Martínez-Vázquez, 2007). For instance, grantors, whose
equalization formulas rely on measures of tax capacity, need to be able to secure this informa-
tion, since, if tax collection is in the hands of local governments, there might be incentives to
under-report the tax base to the higher tiers of authority. Countries that use complex calcula-
tions of spending needs are also particularly vulnerable to incentives to withhold information
(e.g., Australia, the UK, and the Nordic countries, see Kim and Lotz, 2008). Ultimately, the fail-
ure to address these problems can undermine the workings of such grants. According to Bahl
(2000):
“A major constraint to designing a formula grants system is finding the data to
implement and update the system. An important underlying issue is this: formula
grants are appealing because their transparency and objectivity. These advantages
can be taken away if the data to allocate the funds are suspect.” (p.14)
It has often been argued that the least distortionary and manipulable way of allocating grants
are schemes based on the number of inhabitants (see again Bahl, 2000, and Boex and Martínez-
Vázquez, 2007). After all, counting its citizens through periodical censuses is one of the most
basic tasks performed by any country (see Brambor et al., 2016) and having information of
comparable quality for other indicators is a task predominantly undertaken by more modern
administrations. However, if the collaboration of local governments is required for the collec-
tion of population information, even this variable might potentially be manipulated. Such a
problem may be especially acute in developing countries, where the central government lacks
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the capacity to monitor population in the field effectively (as also pointed out by Boex and
Martínez-Vázquez, 2007). Therefore, governments seeking to implement a system in which the
allocation of grants is based on population face a trade-off between accuracy and manipulabil-
ity. Increasing accuracy by relying on local government reports (as opposed to using expensive
and outdated decennial census data) might create incentives to manipulate population figures,
unless the central government can dedicate sufficient efforts to ensure compliance.
In Spain, municipalities are responsible for the administration of their population registers
(Padrón Municipal de Habitantes). Since 1998, the population registered on January 1st deter-
mines the allocation of grants from the central government to the municipalities, while previ-
ously this allocation was based on decennial census data, which is administered by the Spanish
Statistical Office (INE in what follows), a central government agency. In theory, this agency also
coordinates and monitors the municipal register, with the aim of ensuring that population fig-
ures reflect the reality. However, for several years, central government monitoring was far from
perfect and the registered population was systematically inflated. The population censuses
recently carried out uncovered huge numbers of ‘ghost citizens’, i.e., individuals for whom
there was no actual evidence of their residing in the respective municipality. Moreover, sev-
eral scandals have been reported in which city councils have been accused of systematically
manipulating population numbers. The most notorious of these took place in Santa Cruz de
Tenerife (a major city in the Canary Islands). In an audit released in 2009, the INE found nearly
15,000 ‘ghost citizens’ (around 7% of the population), with evidence of fraudulent use of ID
documents, among other irregularities.1 Immediately following the publication of the audit,
the mayor of Las Palmas (the largest city in the Canary Islands) complained about the loss of
grants suffered by his city due to the over-reporting of population in Santa Cruz and, more gen-
erally, about the harm done to the objectivity of the allocation of grants to municipalities in the
region.2
Theoretically, for a given level of enforcement, over-reporting will be larger the more gen-
erous these grants are (i.e., the higher the amount of money linked to an additional resident).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous attempt has been made to estimate the effect of
grant generosity on population over-reporting. The reason for this is that it is very difficult to
estimate this magnitude for a linear grant scheme, since the marginal effect of an additional
resident on the amount of grants is constant across municipalities. Fortunately for our pur-
poses, in Spain, per capita grants to municipalities jump at population thresholds. Specifically,
the grant per inhabitant changes discontinuously at thresholds of 5,000, 20,000 and 50,000 in-
habitants for the entire local population. Per capita grants that increase discontinuously at
1See, for example, “A city with 15,000 ‘ghosts’ [Una ciudad con 15.000 fantasmas]”, in Canarias7, 05/04/2013.
2The undue amounts received by Santa Cruz, during a ten-year period, were estimated at around 40 million
euros, while the mayor estimated the amount of grants lost by Las Palmas at around 6.5 million euros (see “The
mayor of Las Palmas demands compensation for municipalities because of the fraud in the Santa Cruz register
[(El Alcalde de las Palmas) pide al Gobierno una compensación para los municipios por el fraude del padrón en
Santa Cruz]”, in www.eldiario.es, 07/02/2014).
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population thresholds create incentives for municipalities to sort to the right of the threshold,
as one additional inhabitant brings additional grants for all existing inhabitants. Although all
municipalities might be tempted to misreport population figures, the incentives to misreport
are stronger for municipalities close to the threshold. There is considerable anecdotal evidence
from the municipalities citing the increase in grants to justify an aggressive policy to boost
their populations above one of these thresholds.3 Moreover, the jump in grants at the thresh-
old provides exogenous variation in the marginal effect of an additional resident. This allows
to identify the effect of grant generosity on population misreporting. This effect is estimated
for municipalities close to the threshold but can be extrapolated to municipalities far from the
threshold in order to quantify the potential effect of linear grant schemes on the incentives to
misreport.
Policies that create jumps in governments’ choice sets are commonly referred to as notches
(Slemrod, 2010). Notches have been extensively used to study the effects of taxes on the be-
havior of individuals and firms (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). This
paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to exploit notches to study the response of local
governments to the incentives introduced by intergovernmental grants. We make use of these
notches to estimate the effect of grant generosity on population over-reporting. Specifically,
we use the methods developed in the taxation literature to quantify bunching that, in our case,
corresponds to the excess density found above the notch points.4 The method allows us to
estimate the implied responses of population over-reporting to grant generosity. We perform
several heterogeneity analyses (by period and type of municipality) that, linked to a stylized
theoretical model of population reporting, help us to interpret our results.
We find significant responses and heterogeneity in the responsiveness of municipalities to
grants. To the left of the 5,000 threshold, there is a loss of mass of around 10% of the munici-
palities. In the most extreme cases, over-reporting can be as high as 1,000 additional residents,
although on average it is around 60 residents. This implies that, for the most responsive mu-
nicipalities, the elasticity of population over-reporting to grants is about 0.40, while the aver-
age response is around 0.013. The extrapolation of this last number to the whole distribution
of municipalities indicates that the leakage of grant money due to population over-reporting
could be in the order of 40 million euros per year, suggesting potential gains from improve-
ments in audit policies. In fact, we find that the extent of over-reporting is higher during the
period 1998-2005, and almost disappears after 2005, coinciding with an improvement in the
enforcement of population numbers by the INE. We also show how the census is able to iden-
3This is the case, for example, of Manlleu, a city nearby Barcelona; in 2007 the city jumped over the 20,000
threshold and the effect on the amount of grants was discussed in the city council (see “The 20,000 effect [L’efecte
20,000 habitants]”, in El 9 nou, 14/10/2013). In Cardona, another town nearby Barcelona, the mayor called the
population to mobilize against the possibility of falling below the 5,000 threshold and losing grants from the cen-
tral government (see “Cardona mobilized in search of more neighbors [La localidad de Cardona se moviliza para
buscar más vecinos]”, in La Vanguardia, 21/12/2014).
4For an updated review of papers studying bunching see Kleven (2016).
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tify the non-compliers, that is, the municipalities that were shifted below the 5,000 threshold
due to discrepancies between the register and the 2001 census. Non-compliers tend to have
high shares of foreign population (i.e. immigrants) and second homes, which suggest that
over-reporting was more difficult to detect in their case. They also have a low level of civic
capital (as measured by electoral turnout), suggesting that the (political) costs of being caught
to over-report were also lower. These results are consistent with our model’s predictions and
help to explain the heterogeneity we found in the responses. Several pieces of evidence sug-
gest that manipulation (as opposed to real population responses) is the mechanism generating
the observed bunching patterns. A number of robustness checks indicate that these bunch-
ing patterns are not likely to be explained by other institutional arrangements that also change
discontinuously at population thresholds.
A few papers have already studied the incentives created by discontinuities in formula trans-
fers. Litschig (2012) shows that grants allocated through a population-based formula in Brazil
are not effectively shielded from special-interest politics. The central government, responsi-
ble for the administration of relevant population information, inflated the population num-
bers of its politically aligned municipalities. As a consequence, aligned municipalities received
on average more grants than non-aligned municipalities. This indicates that higher-level gov-
ernments may implement formulas that they can subsequently manipulate in their favor. In
contrast, we do not find clear evidence of such political manipulations. Instead, we find that
the behavior of Spanish municipalities is driven by the opportunities and incentives to ma-
nipulate population numbers. The findings in Litschig (2012) and our own results are similar
in the sense that both point to the difficulty of avoiding manipulation of simple population-
based formula grants, but would imply a different solution to the problem: in the case of Brazil
the solution seems to be more transparency while in the Spanish case, it is the improvement
of the administrative capacity of the central agency. Another paper similar to ours is De Witte
and Geys (2015), which studies the incentives introduced by a similar grant in Belgium.5 They
do not find any evidence of over-reporting. However, they find that population and housing
construction growth becomes larger as municipalities approach a threshold, which they inter-
pret as evidence that municipalities use real policies to try to reach the threshold. We find no
evidence of such an effect: the bunching pattern we find clearly indicates manipulation as it
disappears when we look at census data and after an increase in enforcement. Furthermore,
housing growth rates do not vary in any meaningful way as one approaches the threshold. The
differences between the two cases might be indicative of the responses of municipalities to
5Grants which give higher weights per capita when population is larger are not uncommon. Other countries in
Europe rely on similar grant schemes. For example, most German states use population based-grants with chang-
ing slopes, which could potentially raise the incentives to manipulate population numbers around kink points.
These grants are allocated using municipal registers and, in fact, the 2011 census found a big discrepancy between
register and census population. See “Declining population causes dispute over money [Bevölkerungsrückgang
löst Streit ums Geld aus]”, Die Zeit, 31/05/2013). As an example, Baskaran (2016) analyzes such discontinuities in
the allocation formula for general-purpose transfers that the state government of Hesse pays to its municipalities.
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changes in enforcement: when central government monitoring is strictly implemented, mu-
nicipalities cannot manipulate population figures and must rely on other channels to try to
influence population numbers.
The paper also contributes to the literature of regression discontinuity designs that study the
effects of local policies that depend discontinuously on municipality size.6 In a detailed study
of the French, German and Italian cases, Eggers et al. (2017) identify the threats to identification
that arise in this setting and provide guidance for addressing them. As in our study, they docu-
ment discontinuous densities around the relevant population thresholds in all three countries.
Hence, the manipulation of population figures by local authorities seems to be a widespread
phenomenon in Europe. Our study differs from Eggers et al. (2017) in the following respect:
while their study is concerned with the consequences of sorting when estimating the effects of
policies that change discontinuously at population thresholds, we use the sorting induced by
the policy discontinuity to quantify the effect of grants on population over-reporting.
Eventually, the paper also relates to the tax enforcement literature, see e.g. Slemrod (2007)
and Besley and Persson (2013). Our results on the responses to grant generosity mirror those of
papers providing evidence on the effect of tax rates on tax evasion (Fisman and Wei, 2004). Our
findings on the effect of improved monitoring add to the evidence provided by many studies
on the effects of third-party reporting, crosschecking and other tax enforcement technologies
(Bird and Zolt, 2008; Kleven et al., 2011). The evidence that the non-compliers are municipal-
ities with low civic capital is in line with other papers that show that tax compliance is influ-
enced by social capital and political incentives (Casaburi and Troiano, 2015; Besley, Jensen, and
Persson, 2015). Note also that, as in our case, these last two papers deal with non-compliance
that materializes in missing houses and population.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the institutional back-
ground in detail. In Section 3, we develop a stylized model of population over-reporting to
guide the empirical findings. The empirical methods and data are described in Section 4 while
the results are presented and discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we analyze the determi-
nants of the discrepancies between census and register populations to shed further light on
the mechanisms at work. Section 7 concludes.
6The papers by Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) and Bagues and Campa (2016) which study the effects of political
gender quotas that are binding for large municipalities are good examples of such studies in the Spanish case.
7The paper by Casaburi and Troiano (2015) analyzes the effect of an Italian enforcement program that used
aerial photographs to uncover a massive number of ‘ghost buildings’ (i.e., property not included in the land reg-
istry and thus hidden to the tax authorities) that boosted local property tax revenues. In the second paper, Besley,
Jensen, and Persson (2015) focus on the evasion of ‘poll tax’ liabilities in UK. After the introduction of the poll
tax, more than four million of voters disappeared from the electoral register and some local authorities and aca-
demics believed that these missing voters were trying to evade the poll tax (see “‘Missing’ 3.4 million voters put
MPs at risk: poll tax evasion could distort review”, The Independent, 17/06/1993). Scottish local authorities are
still searching their half million missing voters (see “Councils plan to track down poll tax dodgers among ‘missing’
million voters”, The Express, 30/9/2014).
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2 Institutional background
2.1 Local public finance in Spain
The size of the local government sector in Spain is moderate, with municipal budgets repre-
senting around 15 per cent of total public spending in our period of study. Spanish municipali-
ties have spending responsibilities similar to those in other countries (e.g., water supply, refuse
collection and treatment, street cleaning, lighting and paving, parks and recreation, traffic con-
trol and public transportation, social services, etc.), with the sole exception of education, which
is the responsibility of regional governments. In terms of revenues, in 2012, inter-governmental
grants represented 36 per cent of local operating budgets, and 68 per cent of these transfers
were in the form of a formula-based block grant allocated by the central government (the Par-
ticipación Municipal en los Ingresos del Estado - PIE). This grant - as all other financial concerns
of Spanish local governments - is regulated by a law passed in 1988 by the central government
(Law 39/1988 Reguladora de Haciendas Locales) and applies to all municipalities in the coun-
try. Although the variables and their exact weights have experienced (minor) changes over time,
(weighted) population determined the allocation of 75 per cent of its funds during the years of
our study.8
[Figure 1 about here]
To account for supposedly differential spending needs, a weight of 1 is applied to residents
in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. This weight then jumps to 1.17, 1.3 and
1.4 as the population of the municipalities surpasses the thresholds of 5,000, 20,000 and 50,000
inhabitants, respectively.9 As such, the weight or multiplier is not applied exclusively to the
population in excess of the threshold, but rather to the entire population of the municipality.
The effect of the weighting scheme on per capita resources depends on the size of the pot of
funds to be distributed in each year, which is determined by the evolution of national tax rev-
enues. Panel a) of Figure 1 illustrates this with data from 2005 budgets. In that year, the amount
of per capita resources was 96, 113, 125 and 135 euros for municipalities below 5,000, between
5,001 and 20,000, between 20,001 and 50,000, and above 50,000 inhabitants, respectively. The
8The other variables used in the formula are fiscal effort, the inverse of tax capacity, and the number of school
units, see Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005).
9The law establishes a different funding scheme for municipalities with more than 75,000 inhabitants, which
obtain a share of tax revenue in specific taxes (income, VAT and excises). Although the comparison between the
two systems is not straightforward, the second one seems to be more generous, creating also a notch. There is
anecdotal evidence of municipalities aiming at jumping over this threshold; examples are the cases of Benidorm,
in the Mediterranean coast (“Benidorm estimates in 1 million euros the loss of transfer revenues due to the down-
ward correction of 4,700 inhabitants [Benidorm cifra en 1 millón de euros lo que no ingresará del Estado al perder
de un plumazo 4.700 habitantes]”, www.LaMarinaPlaza.com 13/01/2015) and Alcalá de Guadaíra, a city close to
Sevilla (“Alcalá de Guadaíra stays without the ‘City’ status in not passing the 75,000 threshold [Alcalá de Guadaíra
se queda sin la calificación de Gran Ciudad al no llegar a los 75.000 habitantes]”, ABC (Sevilla), 28/01/2016). Un-
fortunately, the very small number of municipalities close to the 50,000 and 75,000 thresholds renders any analysis
unfeasible.
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absolute amount of resources involved are 85,000, 240,000 and 500,000 euros per year, provid-
ing strong incentives to municipalities to ensure they find themselves on the right side of the
threshold. This is shown in Panel b) of Figure 1 for the 5,000 threshold.
2.2 Local population figures
Up to 1998, the population figures used to compute the formula grant were those of the census.
The census quantifies the permanent population of each Spanish municipality by visiting all
households in the country and is the responsibility of the Spanish Statistical Office (INE), an
agency of the central government. The population census is carried out every tenth year, the
last three corresponding to 1991, 2001 and 2011, although a similar operation took place in
1996 (known as the Renovación Padronal) so as to reduce the excessive time lapse between
censuses. The population coming from the 1991 census was used to allocate grants for the
period 1991-1997 whereas grants in 1998 were distributed in accordance with the Renovación
Padronal of 1996.
Since 1998, the population registered on January 1st determines the allocation of grants from
the central government to the municipalities.10 In contrast to the census, the population reg-
ister is administered by municipalities. Residents have to register in the municipality where
they spend most of the year. Being registered is a condition for access to public services (such
as education and health care, for example), and for both Spanish nationals and EU citizens
determines where they are allowed to vote at local elections. Municipalities are responsible of
registering people in the first place, of updating the register in the event of death or migration,
of ensuring all people included in the register are actual residents, and of periodically report-
ing the number of registered residents to the INE. We must be clear about what the INE can
and cannot do in this process. Although the INE can adjust downward the population of the
municipalities, it is not the hierarchical superior of the municipalities and it cannot impose
penalties on them if there is evidence of cheating. The INE or any other agent (e.g., the parties
in the local opposition, a civic association) need to go to courts and a judge will decide on the
case. Municipalities can also go to courts in case the downward adjustment imposed by the
INE is considered arbitrary. The reputation of professionalism of the INE (and also of the court
system) when dealing with these matters is substantial, and there are no cases of complaints
by municipalities related to arbitrary decisions or to partisan favoritism.
The reasons to start using the register to allocate grants were the complaints of local gov-
ernments regarding the gap between census information and reality, and the confidence in the
capacity of the INE’s computerized monitoring system to detect irregularities in the report-
ing of population. On a monthly basis the INE sends information to each municipality about
10Grants in 1999 and 2000 were distributed with the population measured in January 1st 1998 and 1999, respec-
tively. From 2001 and onward, this lag disappears and population on January 1st determines the grants received
in that same year.
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births, deaths and internal migrations. The municipality uses this information and its own op-
erations to update the register and sends a new count to the INE. If the municipality does not
adjust the register to the information send by the INE and it if does not provide evidences that
support this behavior, the INE will adjust the population numbers downwards. These numbers
will also be downward adjusted in the event of new information revealed during a special audit
procedure.
In practice, the automatic monitoring by the INE has been far from perfect for a number of
years, which has led to an over-reporting of population numbers in some municipalities. These
are the two main mechanisms at work:
• Unreported migrations abroad and over-registration of visitors. Internal movements of
either Spanish nationals or foreigners are automatically detected by the INE when the
person registers in another municipality. However, immigrants that return home (or
move to another country) are more difficult to detect, since they seldom communicate
that they have abandoned the country (and the municipality) of residence. In theory, the
municipality is responsible for periodically checking that immigrants still live in town,
but they often lack the incentives to do this job properly. This means that the number
of immigrants is inflated in the register. A similar case is that of the EU citizens and also
of Spanish nationals that spend only part of the year in the municipality (e.g., they own
a second home). Municipalities tend to include them in the register without paying too
much attention to the length of time they spend there.11
• Incorrect inclusion in the register. This might be due to administrative mistakes. For ex-
ample, a resident might be included in the register more than once (i.e., in different cities)
under slightly different names and/or with different documents giving proof of identity
(which happens mostly in the case of immigrants). In some cases the discrepancy is due
to overt attempts to manipulate the register.12
The central government had known about the existence of some of these problems since the
implementation of the system in 1998, but their magnitude was probably unexpected. Note,
11In fact, there is ample anecdotal evidence of municipalities dedicating considerable efforts and resources to
campaigns designed to convince these people to register. For instance, in Cardona (a small town near Barcelona),
the mayor sent a letter to all residents telling them: “We encourage all the inhabitants of Cardona to lend a hand
in enlarging our municipal register (...) with the aim of avoiding the loss of resources”; the letter included detailed
instructions on how to register (see “Cardona mobilized in search of more neighbors [La localidad de Cardona se
moviliza para buscar más vecinos]”, in La Vanguardia, 21/12/2014).
12For example, the INE’s internal investigation of the case of Santa Cruz de Tenerife revealed that “there were
sheets and sheets of names in the register with thousands of false ID documents, while other names were du-
plicated one after another - entire blocks of neighbors that simply did not exist”. The INE found “15,000 ‘ghost’
residents after crosschecking the register with an ID database from the Ministry of the Interior. About 5,000 were
Spanish nationals without a proper ID document, around 7,500 were Spanish nationals without any proper proof
that they registered, and about 2,500 were foreigners that had left the city”. See “Suspicion of fraud in the register
of Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Commission set up to investigate more than 15,000 false IDs [Sospecha de fraude en
el padrón municipal de Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Comienza una comisión para investigar la existencia de más de
15.000 DNIs falsos]”, El Confidencial Autonomico, 17/04/2013.
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for instance, that the huge immigration boom experienced in Spain during those years came as
a surprise in 1998. During this period there was also a massive boom in housing construction
along the coast which exacerbated the problems related to the monitoring of population in
tourist areas. However, the INE has learned from these developments and during the period
it has progressively improved enforcement through the implementation of several automatic
checks and auditing operations:
• The most relevant automatic check is related to deal with the problems involved in moni-
toring immigrants. In order to deal with the under-reporting of out-migration and double
counts, in 2005 the INE made it compulsory for non-EU immigrants to renew their reg-
istration every second year. In theory, all immigrants registered before December 2003
that failed to re-register were to be deleted from the register in December 2005. A simi-
lar mechanism was also implemented for EU residents who, from March 2009, must also
re-register every fifth year.
• Another relevant audit operation was introduced after the 2001 census of population.
The census operations revealed large discrepancies with the register and municipalities
were required to justify these discrepancies or to make the necessary downsize adjust-
ments. These operations were extended until the end of 2004. Also, to deal with problems
of fraud involving Spanish nationals, in 2009 the INE started to cross-validate the register
with the aforementioned ID database built by the Ministry of the Interior.
Three conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, it has been easier for some local govern-
ments to over-report population than it has been for others. This is the case for municipalities
with high shares of immigrants (both non-EU and EU citizens) and those that are home to
many second residences. Second, while some of the over-reporting can be attributed to statis-
tical errors, there is ample anecdotal evidence of overt manipulation of population numbers.
In some cases the manipulation is due to the municipalities shirking on their responsibilities to
manage the register, while in other cases it involves committing illegal acts, and should be qual-
ified as cheating or fraud. Under the Spanish law, the manipulation of the register is a crime
of ‘documentary misrepresentation’ and might entail considerable penalties.13 Although only
fraud can be legally punished, both types of behavior can lead to some sort of punishment by
voters, specially when the strategy to upgrade the status of the municipality fails.14 This sug-
13‘Documentary misrepresentation’ can entail fines, removal from public office, and prison of up to ten years.
In the case of Santa Cruz, the attorney general initiated an investigation that proved the existence of such a crime;
in another case in Gandía - a city on the Mediterranean coast that had jumped fraudulently over the 75,000
threshold, the public official responsible of the statistics department of the city council was convicted of this
and other crimes; see “The arrested civil servant in Gandía falsified more than 200 registrations of immigrants
[La funcionaria detenida en Ganía falseó más de 200 empadronamientos a inmigrantes]”, www.lasprovincias.es,
29/08/2007.
14For example, in the case of Alcalá de Guadaíra cited above, the press reflected that the mayor announced the
arrival of a grant ‘mana’ after reaching the 75,000 inhabitants just before having to admit that the resources would
never come.
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gests that we should find that, controlling for opportunities for over-reporting, places with less
civic capital (i.e., were voters care less about complying with rules) and with politicians that are
less subject to political control should over-report more. Third, the ability of the INE to monitor
the municipal register seems to have improved over time (i.e., after 2005). If the excess mass
observed to the right of the thresholds is explained by manipulation, this phenomenon should
be less intense in the last years of our sample. Analyzing bunching in the 2001 and 2011 cen-
suses provides further evidence to disentangle manipulation from actual population growth as
the underlying mechanism at work.
3 A model of population over-reporting
In this section, we develop a stylized model that captures the story described in the previous
section. The model is similar to a tax evasion model with endogenous probability of detection
(Yitzhaki, 1987; Kleven et al., 2011), although adapted to the specific characteristics of the case
in question. In the model, local governments decide on the population count reported, tak-
ing into account the possibility of a downward adjustment in these figures made by the central
government, which arise as a result of either automatic checks or audits. When deciding on
the amount of reported population, the local government has to weight the benefits derived
from over-stating the count and the potential costs to be borne in case a correction to the pop-
ulation count is applied. This generates an inverted U-shape objective function which implies
bunching in the presence of a notch.
The section is organized as follows. First, we show how the local government determines the
amount of population it will over-report in the case of a linear transfer schedule (i.e., a transfer
allocated proportionally to population). Second, we analyze how the amount of over-reported
population is affected by the presence of a notch in the transfer schedule. Finally, we intro-
duce heterogeneity in the probability of detection and take into account potential downward
adjustments made by the central government.
Linear transfer schedule
For the moment, we assume that the amount of transfers τ received by a local government is
the product of the level of reported population r and per capita transfers α (i.e., τ = αr ). Let’s
define e = r −n as the level of over-reported population, where n is the number of residents
in the municipality (which we assume to be exogenous) and r is reported population. The
probability that population over-reporting is detected is denoted by p(e) . We parametrize p
using the following Pareto distribution p = 1 − eγ where −1 < γ < 0. The local government
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maximizes the following expected utility function:
u = (1−p)α(n +e)+p(αn −θe) (1)
which can be re-written as:
u =αn +αe −p(α+θ)e (2)
where θ measures the cost per over-reported citizen if caught. This specification means that
costs are higher for greater as opposed to smaller deviations, given that massive over-reporting
can hardly be attributed to error. These costs incurred in the event of detection, accounted for
by θ, may include: (i) the possibility of losing resources already spent or compromised (the loss
of transfers after the correction of the population numbers), (ii) the political costs related to
the evidence of incompetence or unethical behavior, and (iii) formal penalties in case a judge
decides there is evidence of unlawful behavior. The expected costs increase with the perceived
probability of detection.









Given that −1 < γ < 0, it can readily be seen that over-reporting increases with grant generos-
ity (α), decreases with the costs faced after over-reporting is detected (θ) and increases if the
probability of detection is low (γ is small in absolute value).
Notched transfer schedule
Let’s now consider the outcomes when the transfer schedule has a notch. The notched sched-
ule can be written as:
τ= [α+βd(r > r̂ )]r (4)
Where d(r > r̂ ) is a dummy variable equal to one if the reported population is larger than the
threshold r̂ . According to this expression, per capita transfers are equal to α if r ≤ r̂ and equal
to α+β if r > r̂ . At the notch threshold, increasing the reported population by one inhabitant
causes the transfers to jump by βr̂ , thus creating powerful incentives to over-report. The utility
of a municipality with a notched transfer is:
u = (1−p)[α+βd(r > r̂ )](n +e)+p[(α+βd(r > r̂ ))n −θe] (5)
12
Figure 2 illustrates the expected utility level with a notched transfer scheme with a discontinu-
ity at r̂ . The increase in utility at the notch is (1− p̂)βr̂ . That is, the increase in grants, βr̂ , times
the probability of not being detected, 1− p̂, where ê ≡ r̂ −n and p̂ ≡ p(ê). In the example shown
in Figure 2, the municipality is close enough to r̂ and the expected utility at the threshold, u(r̂ ),
is higher than at its interior equilibrium, u(r ∗). As it delivers higher utility, this municipality
will report r̂ .
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Panel a) in Figure 3 shows all three possible cases. The dotted line depicts the case of a munic-
ipality that is too far from the threshold. Here, u(r ∗) > u(r̂ ) and so the municipality will report
its interior equilibrium level, r ∗. The dashed line corresponds to the case illustrated in Figure
2 in which the municipality is better off reporting r̂ than its interior equilibrium r ∗. Finally,
the solid line defines the municipality that is indifferent between reporting r ∗ and r̂ . For this
marginal municipality, which reports r̃ ≡ ñ + e∗, the utility achieved at its interior optimum is
equal to the utility at the notch, i.e., u(r ∗) = u(r̂ ), which implies:
αñ +αe∗−p∗(α+θ)e∗ =αñ +αê − p̂(α+θ)ê + (1− p̂)βr̂ (6)
Among the municipalities with r ∗ < r̂ , those with n ≤ ñ will report its interior equilibrium
r ∗, while those with n > ñ will report r̂ . In turn, municipalities with r ∗ > r̂ will just report r ∗15.
Hence, the presence of the notch modifies the reported population density function as shown
in Panel b) of Figure 3. An excess mass appears at r̂ , which corresponds to the density hole
between r̃ and r̂ .
The location of the ‘marginal buncher’ identifies the reported population change induced
by the notch, dr , which amounts to r̂ − r̃ . A measure of the change in grants faced by the
marginal buncher enables us to identify the responsiveness of reported population to grants.
When moving from r̃ to r̂ , grants increase by α(r̂ − r̃ )+βr̂ . Relative to the increase in reported
population, this grant increase is α+βr̂ /(r̂ − r̃ ). Given that just below r̃ grants increase by α,
grants per reported inhabitant increase by βr̂ /(r̂ − r̃ ) between r̃ and r̂ . Hence, the elasticity of
reported population to grants can be estimated as follows:















15Inspecting equation 6 reveals that the expression can only hold for a unique level of population. Note that
the αñ terms drop out, yielding
(
αe∗−p∗(α+θ)e∗) = (αê − p̂(α+θ)ê)+ ((1− p̂)βr̂ ). The left-hand side of this
equation is a constant term, since e∗ and p∗ do not vary across municipalities. It turns out that the right-hand
side is an increasing function of n. For e > e∗, the term αe −p(α+θ)e diminishes with e. Hence, αê − p̂(α+θ)ê
increases with n as ê = r̂ −n. The second term, (1− p̂)βr̂ , also increases with n because of the lower probability of
being caught when reporting r̂ . Hence, there is a unique ñ = r̃ −e∗ for which equation 6 holds.
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From theory to empirics
The stylized model outlined above can be made more realistic by allowing γi to be hetero-
geneous across municipalities to reflect the fact that some municipalities might have more
possibilities of over-reporting than others. To analyze what ‘bunching’ might look like in this
scenario, we resort to simulations. The results are presented in Panel b) of Figure 4. Compared
with the baseline case with no heterogeneity - shown in Panel a) - we see that now the range that
goes from r̃ to r̂ is not completely empty. Indeed, approaching r̃ there are many municipalities
for which deviating from the optimum is now too costly; the proportion of these municipali-
ties decreases steadily as one approaches the notch threshold. Note that in this more realistic
setting, the responses to grants will be municipality-specific. This heterogeneity in responses
implies that r̂ − r̃ and expression (7) would now correspond to over-reported population and
the elasticity of reported population to grants of the most responsive municipalities. When
discussing the results, we will also consider average responses in over-reported population, as
well as in the elasticity of reported population to grants.
[Figure 4 about here]
Empirically, we expect that the heterogeneity in the possibilities of over-reporting is related
to the presence of immigrants and second homes. Heterogeneity can also come from differ-
ences in the costs of over-reporting (i.e. heterogeneous θi ’s). The cost of being caught manip-
ulating population figures can be related to the amount of civic capital (which might be higher
in places with high turnout) and to the degree of control to which the local incumbent is sub-
jected (which will be higher the lower her vote share is). Finally, over-reporting can also depend
on whether the local government is politically-connected to the central government; a mayor
aligned with the central incumbent might expect a lower monitoring effort or that some senior
co-partisan will intercede if regularities are detected. Later on in the paper, we will investigate
the determinants of over-reporting at the municipal level, by examining differences between
register and census population figures. In that analysis, we will be able to assess which sources
of heterogeneity matter the most.
The theoretical framework developed yields predictions in terms of reported population, i.e.
r = n + e. In terms of data, this would correspond more closely to the population figures ini-
tially submitted by municipalities to INE. Unfortunately for our purposes, we can only observe
official population counts, which amount to reported population by municipalities less any
adjustments applied by INE. In terms of our model, we can think of the population figures that
we observe as r −pe or n + (1−p)e. Panel c) in Figure 4 shows bunching for r −pe in the case
where the γi ’s are heterogeneous. For each simulated municipality, p is randomly drawn from
a Bernoulli distribution with p = 1−eγi . For those municipalities that are caught, the adjusted
population will be smaller by e inhabitants with respect to the initially reported population.
Although the excess density (missing mass) to the right (left) of r̂ does not disappear unless all
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over-reporting is detected, there is more bunching in the population figures initially reported
by municipalities - panel b)- than there is for the adjusted population figures -panel c)- which
correspond more closely to the data examined in the empirical exercise.16
4 Bunching identification and data
4.1 Identifying bunching in practice
To quantify bunching behavior, we follow Kleven and Waseem (2013) whose procedure is sum-
marized in Figure 5. Bunching at a notch point can be quantified by calculating the difference
between the empirical density and an estimated counterfactual density.
[Figure 5 about here]
The model outline above predicts that all bunching municipalities will report exactly r̂ . In
order to bring this sharp prediction to the data, we specify the population interval comprised
between the notch (r̂ ) and rU to be the area suspected to show excess density. Likewise, rL
and r̂ specify the population interval suspected to show missing density. Note that rL is the
empirical counterpart of r̃ . Choosing rL and rU defines the excluded range (the area suspected
to be affected by bunching behavior, where L stands for the lower bound and U for the upper
bound). We group municipalities into population bins indexed by j . The baseline bin-size
corresponds to 1 percent of the respective threshold, which results in 50 inhabitants-groups
per bin at the 5,000 threshold, and 200 inhabitants-groups per bin at the 20,000 threshold. We
provide other specifications with different bin-sizes as robustness checks. The counterfactual
distribution is then estimated by fitting a polynomial of order q to the actual distribution of








γi 1[r j = i ]+ε j (8)
The (estimated) counterfactual distribution is built with the polynomial coefficient estimates
obtained in (8), namely, c̃ j =∑qh=0 β̃h(r j )h . The difference between the empirical and estimated
densities provides us with a direct measure of B (the excess mass between r̂ and rU ) and of M
(the missing mass between rL and r̂ ). In practice, it might not always be obvious how to choose
the excluded range, that is, rU and rL . The excess mass should be relatively concentrated to the
right of the notch point and, following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we choose the upper limit rU
by visual inspection. Then, we choose rL by equating the excess mass above the notch (B) with
16Since empirically we will not be able to observe neither e nor p, we do not know the empirical extent of the
difference between the initially reported population (n +e) and the population net of the adjustments applied by
INE (n + (1−p)e) as e and p could be both large or small.
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the missing mass below the notch (M). The method also requires the researcher to specify q,
the polynomial order of the counterfactual density. The city size distribution has been widely
studied in the urban economics literature, and while there is some controversy as to which
parametric distributions best fit the data (see, for example, Gabaix, 1999 and Eeckhout, 2004),
the city size distribution is smooth and can be well approximated by a low-order polynomial.
In our baseline specification, we choose a second-order polynomial (i.e. q=2), although we test
the robustness of the results to higher-order polynomial specifications. To assess the statistical
significance of the results, we follow Chetty et al. (2011) and compute standard errors using the
residual bootstrap.
Besides the empirical methodology explained here, we also perform McCrary (2008)-tests
to formally assess if population densities are continuous at the respective thresholds. We do
so because a discontinuity in the population density is a prediction of our theoretical model
of population manipulation. Besides, the empirical methodology developed by Kleven and
Waseem (2013) becomes problematic to implement in situation where bunching is not obvious
as the method still requires the researcher to specify rU by visual inspection. In these cases, the
McCrary (2008) test becomes a valuable statistic to confirm that there is no bunching in the
data.
4.2 Data
As explained above, we can only observe official population counts, which amount to reported
population by municipalities minus any adjustments applied by INE, i.e. n + (1−p)e. Hence,
B , the excess density to the right of r̂ , is actually referred to municipalities that over-reported
population to surpass r̂ that went undetected.17 However, note that the amount of grants re-
ceived by municipalities is determined by ‘undetected’ over-reporting rather than by the popu-
lation figures initially submitted by municipalities. Hence, from a policy perspective, the over-
reporting responses to grants that we estimate are the relevant ones to assess the consequences
in terms of misallocation of resources.
[Table 1 about here]
We use the official population counts (Padrón municipal) for the years 1998-2011. These
population figures, referred to January 1st, are the ones used to determine the allocation of the
transfer. As explained in Section 2, per capita grants change at thresholds of 5,000, 20,000, and
50,000 inhabitants. We include the range of +/40% of the threshold into our plots and esti-
mations. We have chosen a 40% window because larger windows might include observations
17In some analyses, we will examine municipal population counts from (decennial) censuses, which are con-
sidered to be faithful reflections of the ‘real’ population (Jurado, 2004). In terms of the model, the census provide
us with a measure of real population (n) but does not help us to back out r , the reported population initially
submitted by municipalities.
16
which are affected by the previous or next threshold. Therefore, each graph is based on 40 bins
to the left and another 40 bins to the right of each threshold. Table 1 reports the minimum
and maximum number of yearly observations within +/- 40% of the relevant population over
the period 1998 to 2011. We also report the figure for the 3,000 and 10,000 threshold, which
we will use in a robustness check and for a placebo test, respectively. The table shows that
the municipality size distribution is highly skewed, with the number of relevant observations
decreasing rapidly as we move to the upper thresholds. Note that the empirical methods we
employ here were developed in the context of millions of individual tax returns (see, for exam-
ple, Chetty et al., 2011 and Kleven and Waseem, 2013), and, thus, they rely on thick densities.
We study municipalities instead of individuals, which naturally provides us with fewer obser-
vations. Therefore, we primarily focus on the 5,000 threshold as it provides us with the highest
number of observations possible, but provide similar evidence for the 20,000 threshold.
5 Results
5.1 Bunching at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold
This section identifies and quantifies bunching behavior at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold.
Panel a) in Figure 6 serves as the empirical counterpart of Figure 5, used in illustrating the
empirical methodology. The (appropriately binned) data show the empirical density and pro-
vide strong (suggestive) evidence that there are too many (few) municipalities to the right (left)
of the threshold.
[Figure 6 about here]
Panel b) in Figure 6 shows the McCrary (2008) test and confirms that, indeed, the empirical
density is not continuous at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold. Panel a) in Figure 6 also reports
rL and rU , which determine the excluded range, while the solid line is the counterfactual den-
sity obtained if a second-order polynomial is specified (i.e.q=2). The corresponding bunching
estimates are reported in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here]
rU is chosen by visual inspection at 5,800 inhabitants, which is the first time that the empir-
ical density crosses the threshold of the counterfactual density.18 Summing up the difference
between the empirical and counterfactual densities between r̂ and rU delivers B , the excess
number of municipalities above the threshold. There are 362 municipalities that would be be-
low 5,000 inhabitants in the absence of the notch. The standard error of B is 79.52, indicating
18Below, we provide estimates based on alternative choices of rU .
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that B is statistically significant at the 1% level. Remember that we choose rL (3,850 in our ap-
plication) to equate B and M ; that is, the excess mass between r̂ and rU must equal the missing
mass between rL and r̂ . Hence, the number of missing municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants
is also 362.
The fact that the density hole disappears at 3,850 inhabitants indicates that the most respon-
sive municipalities over-report around 1,150 inhabitants. However, the population interval be-
tween rL and r̂ is far from being empty. Summing the counterfactual density between 3,850
and 5,000 inhabitants gives us the number of municipalities between rL and r̂ that would be
observed in the absence of the notched transfer schedule. Dividing B by this number gives us
the fraction of respondents. Only about 10% of all municipalities that would be in the 3,850-
5,000 range crossed the 5,000 threshold to receive higher per capita grants.19
Within the density hole area, we know the counterfactual (c̃ j ) and observed (c j ) municipality
counts in each bin j . Hence, we can compute the proportion of respondents in each bin as well
as the reported population increase for those that responded; that is, r̂ − r j . This allows us to





(c̃ j − c j )
c̃ j
(r̂ − r j ) (9)
where w̃ j ≡ c̃ j∑r̂
j=rL c̃ j
is the share of counterfactual observations in each bin within the missing
mass area.
Our bunching estimates imply that, on average, the notch increases over-reported popula-
tion by 62 inhabitants. Note that this is more than ten times smaller than the effect found for
the most responsive municipalities and is consistent with the fact that, between rL and r̂ , only
about 10% of municipalities respond to the incentives to over-report created by the notch.
As shown in Section 3, a measure of the density hole along with the change in grants induced
by the notched schedule can be used to compute the elasticity of reported population to grants.
Taking expression 7 and replacing r̃ for its empirical counterpart rL , the elasticity of reported









Recall that the numerator is the percentage increase in reported population when moving
from rL to r̂ . In our application this percentage is 29%. As for the denominator, recall that
19Remember that the population figures that we examine are reported population by municipalities net of any
adjustments made by INE, implying that the responses to grants that we compute are in terms of undetected
population over-reporting. Hence, the set of municipalities found in the 3,850-5,000 interval includes two types
of municipalities. Firstly, municipalities that did not report a population count above the 5,000 threshold to start
with. Secondly, municipalities that having done so, their population count was downsized by INE and moved
below the 5,000 threshold.
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moving from 5,000 to 5,001 increases per capita grants by 85,000 euros (i.e., r̂β). This increase
becomes smaller for municipalities the further they are away from 5,001. For rL , moving from
3,850 to 5,001 increases per capita grants by about 73%. As a result, the elasticity of over-
reported population to grants is around 40% for the most responsive municipalities.














The results indicate that the average elasticity is about 0.013. The two elasticities imply that
doubling per capita grants would increase reported population by 40 and 1.3 per cent for the
most responsive and the average municipality, respectively. Hence, one implication of our re-
sults is that there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the responsiveness of municipalities to
grants, which compromises the fairness of grant allocation. A municipality with a real popu-
lation of 3,850 inhabitants and which successfully over-reports 1,251 inhabitants (that is, a re-
ported population more than 25% higher than its real population) obtains 50% more resources
per ‘real’ resident than a municipality that has and reports 3,850 inhabitants. This extreme
case illustrates just how severe the effects could be for a municipality facing extreme levels of
opportunities and incentives to cheat. Thus, even if this value is not representative on average,
it is a clear reminder that with imperfect auditing a municipality may massively over-report
its number of residents. An average elasticity of 0.013 is the figure that can be considered most
representative of the global effects of population over-reporting. For instance, let’s assume for a
moment that this elasticity is extrapolated to include the whole universe of Spanish municipal-
ities. If we take the total amount of transfers allocated in 2001 (around 2,850 million euros), an
elasticity of this dimension would mean that around 40 million euros were misallocated (i.e.,
0.013×2,850); that is, that an extra 40 million euros would have had to be added to the pot of
transfers in order to ensure a similar amount of transfers (per real resident) as that which would
be available in a situation without manipulation. Although the impact on the level of transfers
enjoyed by a typical (non over-reporting) municipality is not that huge, 40 million euros is by
no means negligible.20
Columns 2 to 5 in Table 2 assess the robustness of the bunching estimates to the specification
of bin size and polynomial order. In columns 2 and 3 we report the estimates obtained when
20Indeed, it would be interesting to compare this figure with the cost of improving the audit technology in order
to put an end to this problem. In reality, this task is far from easy given the general lack of information within the
INE regarding budgeting and the use of resources. However, in order to gauge the magnitude of the problem at
hand, the 40 million euros can be compared to the cost of running a census (which can be considered a quasi-
perfect audit, see next section), which was calculated at 162 million euros in 2001 (and given the ten-year interval
between censuses, this amounts to 16 million per year, source: www.ine.es). Obviously, a census would be carried
out even if there were no over-reporting of population, so the amount actually needed to keep this problem in
check is probably much lower than the savings at stake.
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the density is estimated grouping the observations in bin sizes of 40 and 60, respectively. This
exercise shows that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the bin size. The baseline re-
sults are obtained by estimating the counterfactual density using a quadratic polynomial. Note
that Figure 6 suggests that a second-order polynomial fits the empirical density well (which
is corroborated by the Akaike information criterion). Nevertheless, to assess if the results are
sensitive to this particular parametrization, we re-estimate the bunching using polynomials of
order 3 and 4. The results, reported in columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 indicate that our results are
robust to using higher-order polynomials, too.
Ultimately, we assess the robustness of our results to the choice of the upper limit rU . Table
3 varies the limit in three different ways. In columns 1 and 2, we vary the limit which we have
previously chosen by one bin down (rU = 5,751) and one bin up (rU = 5,851). In column three,
we set the upper limit as half of the baseline specification (rU = 5,401) to illustrate the impli-
cations of such a big change on our results. Note that the methodology described in Section
4 requires the researcher to choose rU by visual inspection given the estimated counterfactual
density. However, the estimation of this density also hinges on specifying the excluded range,
i.e. rU and rL , which makes this problem a dynamic one. The first exercise (columns 1 and 2)
is important as it shows that that the results are not greatly affected by first selecting rU con-
ditional on an estimated counterfactual. The second exercise has been carried out to illustrate
the general sensitiveness of our results with respect to the choice of rU .
[Table 3 about here]
In general, all results of Table 3 confirm our baseline findings. For the small permutation
of −/+ one bin, changes are as expected small and the total number of municipalities found
to manipulate does not change substantially. However, if we cut the upper limit in half to
rU = 5,400 as in column 3, the magnitude of manipulation (by construction) reduces, but sig-
nificance remains almost unchanged as standard errors decrease as well. Other measures, such
as the percentage of respondents and the average dr also remain relatively stable. However, the
computed elasticities decrease such that the average municipality only over-reports 0.7% com-
pared to 1.3% in the baseline estimation. At this stage we cannot justify the choice of rU = 5,800
on other grounds than the criteria of crossing the counterfactual (see Figure 6), the next section
provides indeed evidence that the higher limit is more likely to be correct than the lower one.
5.2 The census as an alternative counterfactual
If all irregularities in the distribution can be attributed to misreporting, data from the census
provides information about the true distribution of municipalities. In such an instance, the
census counts could be directly considered as the counterfactual. This eliminates the need
to specify the bunching range, i.e. (rL and rU ), to estimate the counterfactual density. The
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ability to measure the counterfactual directly offers some substantial advantages over existing
bunching literature, where counterfactuals cannot be directly observed.
Note, however, that this approach would be invalid if responses are real ones, i.e. municipal-
ities attract real new residents. To this end, we first assess if the municipality size distribution
is continuous around the 5,000 threshold in the 2001 and 2011 censuses. The graphical results
are presented in Figure 7 while the results of the McCrary (2008) test are reported in Table 4.
The analyses are performed for each census year separately as well as for the pooled data (2001
and 2011). No sign of discontinuity appears at the 5,000 threshold. These results indicate that
the bunching patterns that we have documented are not explained by responses in real popula-
tion, because in this case this should also be reflected in the census data. Eventually, the census
data can be used to construct the counterfactual density, as it provides the true distribution of
municipalities.
[Figure 7 and Table 4 about here]
However, using the census data to build the counterfactual density comes at the cost that
any dynamics between the census waves would be neglected. Given that during our period
of study only two censuses were performed, we keep the estimation of the counterfactual de-
scribed in Section 4 as the baseline method and compare the results to those obtained by using
the census. In order to capture some of the dynamics which might have occurred during this
period, we pool the 2001 and 2011 census years, and give a weight of 7 to each observation (as
we only have two years of data) in order to achieve a distribution which is comparable to the
baseline specification which pools 14 years (1998-2011). Figure 8 shows graphically the results
of this analysis.
[Figure 8 about here]
Note that the empirical distribution is exactly the same as before (see Figure 6) and the coun-
terfactual has changed only slightly. The first important thing to note here is that the most obvi-
ous choice for the upper limit coincides with the one chosen under the previous approach, i.e.
rU = 5,800. Since the counterfactual here is estimated using all observations without excluding
those in the area affected by bunching, the dynamic problem discussed above (i.e. choosing
rU conditional on an estimated counterfactual which in turn is affected by the choice of rU )
does not arise. We take this as evidence that an upper limit of 5,800 inhabitants seems to be
the most appropriate upper limit here. Note next that the location of the counterfactual has
changed only marginally while the shape seems to be flatter than it was before. Therefore, the
overall count of cheating municipalities is reduced, but also precision has improved. The elas-
ticities we obtain are very similar on average with εr,α = 0.010 but lower for the most responsive
municipality (εrL ,α = 0.177) compared to the baseline case.
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5.3 Bunching with improved enforcement over time
As outlined in Section 2, INE monitoring has improved over time. Municipalities were required
to clean up their registers based on the results of the 2001 census. These operations were ex-
tended until the end of 2004. Subsequently, in 2005, to deal with problems related to the under-
reporting of out-migration and the double-counting of immigrants, the INE obliged non-EU
immigrants to renew their registration every second year. In principle, all immigrants regis-
tered before December 2003 that failed to re-register were to be deleted from the register in De-
cember 2005. Thus, overall, we expect the opportunities to over-report population to be greater
during the first years of our sample. To determine whether bunching is less evident with bet-
ter monitoring, we split our sample into two different sub-periods (1998-2005 and 2006-2011).
Figure 9 shows the bunching patterns for these two sub-periods in panels a) and c) together
with the relevant McCrary (2008) test results in panels b) and d).
[Figure 9 about here]
While qualitatively Figure 9 reveals that there is some evidence of manipulation in both pe-
riods, bunching patterns are stronger during the sub-period in which INE monitoring was less
effective. In the period 1998-2005, the excess density to the right of the 5,000-inhabitant thresh-
old totaled 155 observations while it reached just 35 in the period 2006-2011 period.21 Our re-
sults confirm that weaker institutions give local governments more room to manipulate their
population figures.
5.4 Real population responses?
In the theoretical model outlined in Section 3, we focused on one type of response to the in-
centives created by the transfer schedule, i.e., reporting population numbers that are larger
than the number of real residents in the municipality. Besides the ample anecdotal evidence
suggesting that this has been the main margin of adjustment in the Spanish case, three sets
of results identify manipulation as the main mechanism underlying bunching behavior. First,
Figure 7 and the results of Table 4 indicate that there is no bunching in census data, suggest-
ing that real population responses are not explaining the bunching patterns observed in the
population register. Second, as shown in Figure 9, as monitoring has improved over time (and
detection probabilities have increased), the amount of bunching has decreased.
However, municipalities might also respond by enacting more expansionary zoning policies
to attract newcomers.22 To test this hypothesis directly, we use data from the municipal cadas-
tres to examine the growth of the stock of dwellings in our period of consideration. The re-
21Note that this exercise is not one of decomposition, as rU is chosen by visual inspection in each sub-period.
It turns out that rU is smaller in each of the two sub-periods than it is for the entire period.
22There is ample evidence that the preferences of voters and politicians determine the amount of developable
land and other zoning instruments (see, e.g. Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012, 2013).
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sults, which are deferred to the Online Appendix I, indicate no evidence of a differential growth
around the 5,000 population threshold. All in all, the different pieces of evidence suggests that
manipulation is the mechanism underlying the observed bunching patterns.
5.5 Bunching at the 20,000 threshold
As discussed above, the techniques used in this paper have been developed to analyze the thick
densities of individual tax returns. For this reason, the paper has focused primarily on the first
population threshold fixed at 5,000 inhabitants. However, in this subsection we analyze the
bunching that occurs at the 20,000-inhabitant threshold. The results are presented in Figure
10. Panel a) shows the bunching metrics developed in Section 4.1 while panel b) reports the
corresponding McCrary (2008) test results. Table 5 summarizes the information in a similar
way as to that used for the 5,000-inhabitant threshold.
[Table 5 and Figure 10 about here]
The McCrary (2008) test indicates that the density is not continuous at the 20,000 threshold
and that it is higher just above that threshold. The bunching estimates imply that the coun-
terfactual density is distorted between 19,801 and 20,201 inhabitants. The estimate for B, that
is, the number of municipalities above 20,000 inhabitants that should be below this threshold,
is 18.36. The standard error of B is 10.001 which yields a p-value of 0.06. Recall that B is also
the missing number of municipalities between 19,801 and 20,000 inhabitants (M). B amounts
to 0.33 of the counterfactual density in the 19,801-20,000 range, and gives us the fraction of
municipalities that respond to the incentives to bunch. In terms of responses, the most elastic
municipalities over-report around 200 inhabitants, while the average response (dr ) is 72. The
corresponding elasticities are 0.002 and 0.0003 for the most responsive and the average mu-
nicipality, respectively. Although this exercise might have limited power, the results obtained
imply that the responses are relatively smaller than those obtained for the 5,000-inhabitant
threshold. Note that while the density hole disappears at a point that is 200 inhabitants below
the 20,000 threshold, the empirical density was below the counterfactual density at 3,850 in-
habitants in the case of the analysis of the 5,000-inhabitant threshold. The results also suggest
that there is less heterogeneity in the responses at the 20,000 threshold, with a third of munici-
palities responding, compared to the 10 per cent recorded at the 5,000 threshold. Interestingly,
the average number of over-reported inhabitants is very similar in both cases: 62 and 72 in the
5,000- and 20,000-inhabitant thresholds, respectively. This is consistent with most municipal-
ities being able to over-report, if needed, a few score of inhabitants irrespective of their size
(rather than a fixed proportion of their population), as these individuals can be attributed to
mistakes or randomness. A further, complementary, explanation might be that the INE moni-
tors large municipalities more intensely, given that small municipalities are more expensive to
monitor in per capita terms.
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5.6 Other policy discontinuities
Eggers et al. (2017) and Ade and Freier (2011) have shown that in many instances several poli-
cies are simultaneously changing at a certain population threshold. Although anecdotal ev-
idence from the municipalities engaged in manipulation indicates that in practice increased
transfers are the only advantage considered, there are four other institutional arrangements
that change at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold: spending responsibilities, maximum tax rates,
council size and gender quota in local elections. We address these concerns in detail in the
Online Appendix II.
First, we provide evidence that public spending on the relevant spending categories which
become mandatory after reaching the 5,000 population threshold do not change discontinu-
ously at this population level. Instead, the analysis shows that per capita spending on these
items grows continuously with population. Second, in Section 6 we examine differences be-
tween census and register population figures. This analysis shows that municipalities that
over-report more are not more indebted and do not set higher local tax rates, suggesting that
maximum tax rates are unlikely to account for the observed bunching. Third, the number of
representatives sitting on the council increases from 11 to 13 at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold.
We show that this (moderate) change in council size at the 5,000-inhabitant threshold does not
have a significant impact on council fragmentation. Furthermore, we conduct a placebo anal-
ysis at the 10,000-inhabitant threshold, where there is a larger increase in council size (from 13
to 17 seats) while per capita grants remain constant. No bunching at the 10,000 threshold is
found (c.f. Table 5 and the Online Appendix II), providing further evidence that council size is
unlikely to explain the bunching pattern observed at the 5,000 threshold. Finally, gender quo-
tas were established for the first time in the 2007 local elections and require the two genders
to be represented in at least 40% of the positions on every municipal electoral list in munic-
ipalities exceeding 5,000 inhabitants.23 Although the gender quota cannot explain the more
pronounced bunching patterns observed in the 1998-2005 period, this reform could explain
why bunching is reduced towards the end of the period we study. To discard this possibility,
we study bunching around the 3,000 threshold in 2011 as gender quotas were extended to this
lower population threshold in that year. Results do not show any evidence of manipulation
around that threshold, confirming that the introduction of gender quota did not reduce popu-
lation manipulation.
6 The 2001 Census as an ‘audit’ operation
Our results clearly indicate that too many municipalities lie above the threshold, but are so far
silent about what specific type of municipalities tend to over-report their population figures.
23Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) and Bagues and Campa (2016) study the effects of the gender quota on female
representation and on policy outcomes.
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The 2001 census was the last field operation (including visits to all households) to produce mu-
nicipal population figures (with base date November 2001) and can be considered to be a faith-
ful reflection of the ‘real’ population (Jurado, 2004). This implies that comparing the census
and register population figures is informative about the characteristics of the municipalities
that manipulated their population data.
Focusing on the sample of municipalities that report a population level between r̂ and rU , we
estimate two different models to analyze the channels through which manipulation might oc-
cur. First, we compute the percentage deviation between the January 2002 register population
and the 2001 census population, where a positive value indicates the percentage (as a fraction
of 100) in which the register population exceeds the corresponding census figure. Second, we
estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for a munic-
ipality reporting a population larger than 5,000 inhabitants in January 2002 while the census
reported a population below 5,000 in November 2001. We control for the distance between
reported population and the 5,000-inhabitant threshold in both regressions. We also control
for population growth between 2001 and 2002 to proxy for the potential ‘real’ growth occurring
between November 2001 and January 2002. Table 6 shows the results for both type of models,
which we perform over a variety of potential indicators for the underlying channel. Each entry
comes from a separate regression. In columns (1a) and (2a), we present the point estimates of
the OLS and the average marginal effects for the logit model, respectively. Columns (1b) and
(2b) show the increase of the R2 (Pseudo-R2 in the logit analysis) experienced by the model
compared to a specification which only includes the above-mentioned control variables. This
helps to interpret the relative contribution of each variable in explaining the variation of the
two outcomes.
[Table 6 about here]
Among the municipal characteristics analyzed, we first consider factors that reflect differ-
ences in over-reporting opportunities. In terms of the model presented in Section 3, these
differences would correspond to heterogeneous detection probabilities (the γ’s). Specifically,
we include the % of immigrants in 2001, row (i), and the % of second homes in 2001, row (ii).
Next, we consider political variables to proxy for differences in the incentives to over-report,
related to the (political) cost of being caught over-reporting population (the θ’s in Section 3).
In row (iii), we introduce the vote turnout in the 2000 national elections. We do so because
in places with a higher turnout, the level of civic capital of the population is higher (Putnam,
1993) and, thus, residents would not agree to report misleading population figures (even if this
were to benefit the town in terms of extra transfers). There is a vast literature supporting the
idea that tax compliance is higher in places with higher ‘tax morale’ (Slemrod, 2007), and some
recent papers documented that tax enforcement is also higher in places with more social cap-
ital (see e.g., Casaburi and Troiano, 2015, and Besley, Jensen, and Persson, 2015). In row (iv),
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we consider the incumbent vote share in the last municipal elections (see Besley, Persson, and
Sturm, 2010). Here the prediction is ambiguous. On the one hand, we expect that an incum-
bent who won the election with a very small share of the vote would be subject to more strin-
gent controls. Those incumbents may face a stronger opposition (which will be more active in
the council asking for information and has more incentives to denounce irregularities to the
press or the judiciary), and also find more difficult to sustain a majority in the council in or-
der to retain the mayoralty.24 Moreover, if the level of civic capital is high and voters dislike
cheaters, the incumbent might also feel less safe electorally. Note, however, that if the level of
civic capital is low, voters might actually reward population over-reporting, such that the in-
centives to cheat might actually increase the more competitive the elections are. In row (v), we
introduce a partisan alignment indicator variable that takes a value of one if the mayor belongs
to Partido Popular, the party in office at the national level during the period 1996-2004. We do
so to test if, as Litschig (2012) has documented for Brazil, the over-reporting of population is
higher in municipalities that are aligned with the central government. Note that in contrast to
Brazil, in Spain, local population figures are reported by municipalities. Nevertheless, the cen-
tral government might put less effort into monitoring aligned municipalities or might intercede
in case that irregularities are detected.
Finally, in rows (vi) to (viii), we include fiscal incentives to determine whether over-reporting
is related to situations of fiscal distress. Specifically, we test if municipalities with high debt
service, row (vi), or high rates of property tax, row (vii), or business tax, row (viii), cheat more.
Our results underline mostly the importance of manipulation opportunities and, to a lower
extent, political cost-related incentive channels. The percentage of immigrants seems to be
particularly important. In both models the effect is statistically highly significant and indicates
that municipalities with a high % of immigrants are more likely to manipulate the population
register. This is consistent with the fact that the probability of detection is lower if the res-
idents being over-reported are foreigners. The estimates imply that a one percentage point
increase in this variable increases the difference between register and census by 0.577%. Sim-
ilarly, the logit estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the % of immigrants
increases the probability of a municipality having over-reported its population so that it sur-
passes the 5,000-threshold by 0.027. The estimates imply that increasing the % of immigrants
by one standard deviation (4.46) increases over-reported population by 2.58 percent, which
amounts to 1.54 times the variable’s mean (1.68). As for the probability of having over-reported
population to surpass the 5,000-threshold, the corresponding effect is 0.12, which amounts
to 0.71 times the variable’s mean (0.17). The relevance of the % of immigrants is confirmed
by looking at the variable’s contribution to the R2 and the Pseudo-R2. Specifically, these two
statistics increase by 0.42 and 0.11, respectively. The impact of the share of second residences
24See Solé-Ollé (2006) and Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) for evidence that local incumbents in Spain
are sensitive to these incentives.
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as another variable reflecting increased manipulation opportunities is much smaller and it is
only statistically significant in the logit analysis. There, the results indicate that increasing the
share of second homes by one standard deviation (12.09), increases the probability of having
over-reported population to surpass the 5,000-threshold by 0.036, which is only 0.21 times the
variable’s mean. Accordingly, the results reported in columns (1b) and (2b) show that this vari-
able adds little to the predictive power of the two models.
In the case of variables reflecting differences in the political costs of manipulation, munic-
ipalities with more civic capital (reflected in a higher voter turnout in national elections) are
less likely to manipulate population numbers. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in
turnout decreases the difference between register and census populations by 0.069%, which
translates into 0.55% percent if one considers, instead, a standard deviation increase in the
variable (7.99). This effect represents 0.33 times the variable’s mean. The estimates of the
logit model are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. A one percentage point increase in
vote turnout decreases the probability that a municipality surpassed the 5,000-threshold by
over-reporting population by 0.006, which increases to 0.048 if a one standard deviation is
considered (7.99). This effect is 0.28 of the variables average value. Note that the R2 and the
Pseudo-R2 statistics also convey the message that voter turnout plays a smaller role than the %
of immigrants in predicting which municipalities over-report more. As for the rest of variables
capturing political incentives, municipalities in which the position of the incumbent is rela-
tively secure (measured by the incumbent vote share in the last local elections) are not found
to over-report more nor less. As for the political alignment variable, although the estimated
coefficients are positive, we do not find statistically significant effects. Finally, we find no ev-
idence that more indebted municipalities or those that set higher local tax rates cheat more,
indicating that manipulation is not driven by the need for fiscal resources.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the notches generated by a transfer system to local governments.
We find significant evidence that the incentives generated by the grant schedule result in the
manipulation of population figures. Municipalities, which are responsible for the registration
of local residents, systematically inflate their population figures, thereby making them eligi-
ble for higher per capita transfers. Specifically, we found a missing mass of around 10% of the
municipalities to the left of the 5,000-inhabitant threshold, where transfers per capita jump dis-
cretely. Municipalities in this range over-report by an average of 60 more residents than those
actually living in the town. However, in some municipalities the number of ‘ghost’ residents
reaches 1,000. The amount of misallocated transfers is far from negligible (we estimate a fig-
ure of around 40 million euros for 2001), which suggests more resources should be assigned to
audit policies. Indeed, we find evidence that enhanced audit policies are effective in curbing
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this problem. For instance, we found that bunching disappeared after the national statisti-
cal agency introduced several audit improvements (including, for example, using the census
to cleanse the population register, and requiring immigrants to re-register every two years).
Our analysis of the discrepancies between the census and the register also reveals that the mu-
nicipalities more prone to over-reporting are those in which there are greater opportunities
(a higher share of immigrants and second homes) and incentives (less civic capital) to do so.
These results are consistent with the predictions of the model presented in this paper and also
suggest that the reason municipalities bunch to the right of the transfer thresholds is popula-
tion over-reporting. Moreover, the fact that we find no bunching in census figures is a further
proof that municipalities do not respond to transfers by attracting more residents (or if they do
so, they are largely ineffective).
The general conclusion to be drawn from our results is that even very simple formula trans-
fers (such as those based on population) can be manipulated by recipients if their collaboration
is needed in supplying information, and if the control policies operated by the central govern-
ment are imperfect. While it is true that the size of the effects that we find are not especially
large (the loss of resources is not dramatic, even without proper auditing systems) and that the
problem was resolved when the national government intervened, they nevertheless serve as
a warning to governments and consultants advising on similar transfer systems in developing
countries - if the system can be manipulated in a developed country (with a modern, albeit
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(b) grants in absolute values
Notes: 75% of PIE allocated according to municipalities’ population. Official data for 2005.























Notes: u(linear) is utility under a linear transfer scheme while u(notched) is utility under a notched transfer
scheme with notch at r̂ . u(r∗) and u(r̂ ) are the utility levels when reporting the population levels that corre-
spond to the interior equilibrium r∗ and the notch r̂ . At the notch, utility increases by (1− p̂)βr̂ where 1− p̂ is the
probability of not being caught over-reporting r̂ and β is the additional transfers received if reporting r̂ .
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(b) Density function
Notes panel (a): utilities for different population levels. For a population level ñ ≡ r̃ − e∗, the utility level of re-
porting r̃ equals the utility level of reporting r̂ . For a population level lower than ñ (dotted line), the interior
equilibrium yields higher utility than reporting r̂ . In contrast, for a population level higher than ñ (dashed line),
reporting r̂ yields higher utility than reporting the interior equilibrium. Notes panel (b): pre-notch density is the
density that would be observed in the absence of the notched transfer scheme. Post-notch density is the density
that emerges once municipalities have responded to the incentives to bunch at r̂ .
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(c) Heterogeneity, observed population, n+(1−p)e
Notes: Densities obtained from simulation based on 100k draws. n drawn from a log-normal distribution with
mean and standard deviation equal to 6.458 and 1.840. α, β, θ equal to 100, 16, 400. In panel (a) - no heterogeneity
-, γ is -0.1 while γi ∼ U (−0.2,−0.1) in Panels (b) and (c). Panel (c) plots observed population, that is, reported
population less the adjustment made by INE in case that the municipality is caught over-reporting, i.e. n+(1−p)e.
For each simulated municipality, p is a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution with p = 1−eγ.
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Figure 5: Theoretical illustration of the procedure used to identify bunching
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Notes: The lower and upper population bounds (rL and rU ) define the excluded range, that is, the population
interval suspected to be affected by bunching behavior. The counterfactual density is fitted excluding the data
points in the excluded range. rU is determined by visual inspection while rL is set to ensure that the excess mass
(B) in the r̂ -rU range equals the missing mass (M) in the rL -r̂ interval.
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Figure 6: Baseline graph: 5,000-threshold










































Notes: Notching around 5,000 inhabitants. Bins of 50 inhabitant size in panel a). Parameters chosen automatically
in panel b). Pooled for 1998-2011. On the vertical axis, bunching is expressed in frequencies and the McCrary
(2008) test in densities. The range of the horizontal axis is identical in both graphs, but expressed either in the
bins included (bunching) or in population (McCrary, 2008). Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.
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(c) 2001 and 2011 pooled
Notes: McCrary (2008) test on 2001, 2011, and pooled census information. Bandwidth and binwidth automatically
determined by the routine.
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B (# of municipalities): 235
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Notes: Notching around 5,000 inhabitants. Bins of 50 inhabitant size in panel. Pooled for 1998-2011. On the
vertical axis, bunching is expressed in frequencies.
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Figure 9: Bunching with varying levels of enforcement: 5,000-threshold
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(b) 1998-2005 - McCrary
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s.e.: .087
(d) 2006-2011 - McCrary
Notes: notching around 5,000 (panel a and b) inhabitants. The size of each bin is 1% of the threshold (i.e. 50
inhabitants). Pooled for 1998-2005 (panel a) and 2006-2011 (panel b). On the vertical axis, bunching is expressed
in frequencies and the McCrary (2008) test in densities. The range of the horizontal axis is identical in both graphs,
but expressed either in the bins included (bunching) or in population (McCrary, 2008). Dashed lines show 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure 10: Bunching at the 20,000 threshold
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(b) 1998-2011 - 20,000 inhabitants
Notes: Notching around 20,000 inhabitants. The size of each bin is 1% of the threshold (i.e. 100 or 200 inhabitants,
respectively). On the vertical axis, bunching is expressed in frequencies and the McCrary (2008) test in densities.
The range of the horizontal axis is identical in both graphs, but expressed either in the bins included (bunching)
or in population (McCrary, 2008). Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.
Table 1: # of observations around thresholds (+/- 40%)










Table 2: Baseline results - Bunching at the 5,000 threshold
Polynomial order (q) 2 2 2 3 4
Bin size 50 40 60 50 50
Range [rL , rU ] [3850, 5800] [3840, 5800] [3860,5840] [3550, 5800] [4400, 5800]
# municipalities (B) 362*** 338*** 366*** 287*** 191**
s.e. (B) 79.523 72.908 76.236 77.581 91.275
% of respondents 0.100 0.092 0.102 0.060 0.110
Average dr 63.319 71.270 66.270 71.934 53.957
εrL ,α 0.403 0.408 0.398 0.688 0.100
εr,α 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.021 0.006
McCrary 0.323***
s.e. (McCrary) 0.059
Notes: Pooled observations 1998-2011. The McCrary (2008) test is based on the sample until the next population
threshold is reached and calculated with automatic bandwidth and bin size determination. The standard error for
B is obtained by (residual) bootstrapping. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 3: Variation of rU - Bunching at the 5,000 threshold
Polynomial order (q) 2 2 2
Bin size 50 50 50
Range [rL , rU ] [4001, 5751] [3701,5851] [4451, 5401]
# municipalities (B) 320*** 362*** 188***
s.e. (B) 80.647 91.415 47.804
% of respondents 0.105 0.086 0.120
Average dr 60.766 74.344 56.272
εrL ,α 0.327 0.590 0.092
εr,α 0.012 0.020 0.007
Notes: Pooled observations 1998-2011. The standard error for B is obtained by (residual) bootstrapping. *** p <
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 4: McCrary (2008)-test of census population
2001 2011 2001/2011
McCrary 0.167 -0.023 0.035
s.e. (McCrary) 0.177 0.217 0.153
Notes: McCrary (2008) test on 2001, 2011, and pooled census information. 40% window around the threshold.
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Table 5: Bunching at the 20,000 and 10,000 threshold
Threshold a) 20,000 b) 10,000
Range [rL , rU ] [19800, 20200] [9200, 10200]
# municipalities (B) 18** 21
s.e. (B) 9.179 20.080
% of respondents 0.335 0.031
Average dr 72.357 18.056
εrL ,α 0.002 .
εr,α 0.0003 .
McCrary 0.449*** 0.104
s.e. (McCrary) 0.119 0.082
Notes: Pooled observations 1998-2011. The McCrary (2008) test is based on the sample until the next population
threshold will be reached and calculated with automatic bandwidth and bin size determination. No elasticities
reported at 10,000 as grants remain unchanged. The standard error for B is obtained by (residual) bootstrapping.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
43
Table 6: The determinants of over-reporting
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
percentage deviation Probability(cheating)
Coeff. ∆R2 MFX ∆Pseudo −R2
cheating opportunities
(i) % of immigrants 0.577*** 0.422 0.027*** 0.111
(0.053) (0.007)
(ii) % of second homes 0.034 0.013 0.003** 0.027
(0.025) (0.001)
political incentives
(iii) vote turnout -0.069* 0.023 -0.006** 0.032
(0.038) (0.003)
(iv) incumbent vote share 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007
(0.024) (0.002)
(v) partisan alignment / right wing 0.479 0.005 0.083 0.018
(0.693) (0.052)
fiscal incentives
(vi) debt service 0.260 0.002 -0.134 0.001
(4.211) (0.320)
(vii) business tax rate 0.019 0.003 0.035 0.001
(1.448) (0.116)
(viii) property tax rate 0.001 0.003 0.098 0.003
(1.962) (0.144)
Notes: Total observation count is 160. Column 1a presents OLS estimates where the dependent variable is 100×
[register2002/census2001]− 1; Mean (SD) of 1.677 (3.831). Column 2a presents average marginal effects (MFX) of
logit estimates. The binary dependent variable is =1 if the January 2002 register figure is above the 5,000 threshold
while the November 2001 figure is below; There are 27 cheaters. All regressions include as controls a constant, the
distance to the 5,000 threshold and the population growth between 2000 and 2001. % of immigrants is the share
of foreign inhabitants in total population in 2001; Mean (SD) of 2.521 (4.465). % of second homes is the share
of homes characterized as second residences in 2001; Mean (SD) of 14.378 (12.093). Vote turnout is the turnout
at the 2000 national elections at the municipal level; Mean (SD) of 72.658 (7.993). Incumbent vote share is the
vote share of the mayor’s party in the local council at the 1999 elections; Mean (SD) of 48.419 (12.960). Partisan
alignment/ right wing indicates whether the mayor is right wing; Mean of 0.262. Debt service is the sum of interest
and principal debt payments as a share of total current revenue in 2000; Mean (SD) of 0.077 (0.073). Property tax
rate is the 2000 statutory rate in the “Impuesto sobre la Propiedad Inmueble” - Mean (SD) of 1.143 (0.356) - while
the business tax rate is the “Coeficiente de Incremento” is the 2000 tax rate in the “Impuesto sobre Actividades
Económicas”; Mean (SD) of 0.535 (0.199). Columns 1b and 2b report the increase in ∆R2 (Pseudo−R2 in the logit
analysis) experienced by the model compared to specification which only includes the above-mentioned controls.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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